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Abstract
This paper considers the impact on sectoral outputs and employments of rapid and large
changes in relative prices, such as those which occurred in transition economies during the
1990s.  A simple general equilibrium model is developed in which price changes are induced
by a tax reform and resource mobility is restricted.  The reform is designed to improve the
quality of the price system, but is shown to cause a recession the size of which is proportional
to the initial tax distortion.  It is also demonstrated that a wage flexibility would moderate the
magnitude of the recession, but this gain would be obtained at a cost in longer term efficiency,
and would be, in any case, unsustainable.
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Introduction
The phenomenon of large output falls in the economies of Central Europe (CE) and the
Former Soviet Union (FSU) during their systemic transformation in the 1990s is one of the most
researched and yet still controversial. Kornai (1994) proposed the term “transformational
recession” to indicate that these falls were directly related to the change of economic system
rather than to transition policies. However, they took place against the background of rapid
growth in China and Vietnam, which had been also introducing fundamental changes of their
economic systems. This may indicate that the falls were related not merely to the systemic
transformation as such, but also to its speed. Stiglitz (1999), among others, argues that the speed
of transition was a choice variable, and choosing high speed was a major error. In a recent
survey of evidence and interpretations of the recession, Gomulka (1998) suggests that in the
countries of CE and the FSU the rapid speed was forced principally by the initial conditions of
their much deeper (economic, institutional and political) crisis. In the survey, four classes of
specific causes of output falls were identified:
1. sharp changes in relative prices in conditions of limited resource mobility;
2. the elimination of excessive real aggregate demand to establish buyers’ markets;
3. the collapse of captive markets within the former CMEA area; and
4. the collapse of the arms industry and of state-financed investments in housing, energy,
agriculture, and infrastructure.
In this paper we discuss only the potentially contractionary impact of a rapid change in
relative prices. We develop a simple demonstration model. In this model, relative prices change
because of changes in taxes and subsidies. In practice relative prices also changed significantly
as a result of rapid price and trade liberalization, sharp increases in interest rates and large
up-front devaluations. However, what is important here is the fact that relative prices have
changed rapidly and massively, not what caused these changes. To discuss the impact of such
changes, Blanchard (1997), proposed a two-sector model in which, before transition, one sector
(state-owned) is subsidized and the other (private) is taxed. In that model, however, resources
are assumed to be fully mobile, so that any output contraction in the state sector in response to
the removal of subsidy could, in principle, be matched by an increase in private sector output in
response to a tax-reduction, so that the aggregate output need not decline. The Blanchard model
is unconvincing for two other reasons. Firstly, in transition economies the private sector was
typically very small at the outset of transition and, secondly, the large informal private sector
which emerged during transition was taxed less than the state sector. The key empirical features
which we wished to incorporate in our model were the rapid change of the highly differentiated
tax treatment of (initially) state enterprises during transition and the very limited mobility of
resources between these enterprises. We also show that the output fall which results in such
circumstances can be moderated by wage flexibility. However, a short term gain in lower output
and employment losses is obtained at a cost in lower long-term efficiency, and is, in any case,
unsustainable.
The Model
The economy we consider is assumed to produce consumer goods only, of which two kinds
are purely private and one kind purely public. Labour is assumed to be the only input needed.
The wage costs of producing public good are financed in full by taxes imposed on the sale of
private goods. However, initially, under the centrally-managed system, the two tax rates were
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highly differentiated; one rate might even be negative. An important aspect of the systemic
transformation is equalization of tax rates, as a means of improving substantially the quality of
the price system. We assume that this tax equalization is introduced suddenly. Such a reform
causes, therefore, a rapid and large change in relative prices. Moreover, since it shifted supply
functions, the reform respresents a supply shock.
Our primary purpose is to investigate the short-term impact of such a sudden change in
relative prices on the composition of demand and on sectorial and total employment, under the
assumption of limited labour mobility. This latter assumption reflects the fact that the production
of specific goods requires, typically, specific skills. Moreover, production is based in specific
localities, but labour mobility between localities is often limited, especially in the short-term.
Boeri and Flinn [1999] computed some standard measures of mobility and showed that “there is
strikingly more interindustry and interoccupational mobility in countries with rigid labour
markets, like Italy, than in Central and Eastern European transforming economies” (p. 30). We
interpret this limited skill and space mobility to mean that, following the price shock,
employment in each sector cannot exceed the level just before transition to equal tax rates. To
simplify analysis, we assume that the wage rate is the same in all sectors and that the utility
function for the representative household is of the Cobb-Douglas type. As there are no savings,
the utility maximizing households would then spend constant fractions of their wage income on
each of the two private goods.
The economy is therefore described by the following equations:
pix i = ai >
j=1
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wLjD, i = 1,2, a1 = a and a2 = 1 ? a   #   
pi = Viw + tipi, i = 1,2   #   
p3 = V3w   #   
LjD = Vjx j, j = 1,2,3   #   
x3 = G, given   #   
t1p1x1 + t2p2x2 = p3G   #   
V1x1 + V2x2 + V3G ² L,with equality before the shock.   #   
In those equations x’s are quantities of private goods, p’s are prices, w is the wage rate, V’s
are fixed labour inputs per unit of output, t’s are tax rates, G is the given supply of public good
and L is the total labour supply.
The two key features of the economy are, firstly, full employment before transition and,
secondly, that
t2 << t1 < 1 before transition
t2 = t1 = t > 0 after transition
The tax rate t2 may be negative before transition, indicating that goods of type 2 were
subsidized at that time. In what follows, we solve the system (1) to (7) in order to establish the
effect on sectorial outputs and employments of the sudden tax equalization. Apart from
technical coefficients, the given parameters are w,G and - before transition - one of the tax rates.
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The Economy Before Transition
By assumption there is full employment of labour, at a common wage rate w, in all sectors.
Therefore, p2x2 = Ý1 ? aÞwL. As p2 = V2w + t2p2, this implies that
x2 = Ý1 ? aÞÝ1 ? t2ÞL/V2 ¯ x2.   #   
So from (7)
x1 = Ý1 ? Ý1 ? aÞÝ1 ? t2ÞÞL/V1 ? ÝV3/V1ÞG ¯ x1.   #   
From (1) and (3) the budget equation (6) becomes, ßat1 + Ý1 ? aÞt2à>
i=1
3
Li/L = V3G/L. Hence
t1 = V3GaL ?
1 ? a
a t2   #   
This full employment constraint is illustrated by the thick line in Fig.1. It is the lower boundary
of the long-run ‘tax-possibility’ set.
We regard t2 as given, and t1 is adjusted, depending on the fixed t2 and G, to satisfy the
budget constraint. Prices and sectorial employments immediately follow. In particular,
L1 = V1x1 = Ý1 ? Ý1 ? aÞÝ1 ? t2ÞÞL ? V3G ¯ L1   #   
and
L2 = V2x2 = Ý1 ? aÞÝ1 ? t2ÞÞL ¯ L2   #   
Social welfare is maximized when t1 = t2 = tD, say. footnote From (10) it follows that
tD = V3G/L, so the optimal quantities are:
X1LT = aÝ1 ? tDÞL/V1 and X2LT = Ý1 ? aÞÝ1 ? tDÞL/V2   #   
However, these quantities can be produced only in the long term, i.e., after a suitable
redeployment of labour between sectors and the necessary adjustments in terms of skills and
places of work. This long term equilibrium is shown by the point ELT in Fig.1 and Fig.2, the
latter showing the long term production possibility frontier as determined by the full employment
condition: V1x1 + V2x2 = L ? V3G.
By assumption, t1 >> t2, so the initial situation (point ‘0’ in both Figures) is
suboptimal. footnote We seek to examine the short term impact of improving the signalling
function of prices by eliminating the tax distortion between the two (private goods) sectors.
The Economy Just After Transition
The quantities x1 and x2 must still satisfy the supply-demand equation:
pix i = aiwÝV1x1 + V2x2 + V3GÞ, i = 1,2   #   
where the product prices are given by
3
pi = wVi/Ý1 ? tiÞ, i = 1,2.   #   
Solving (14) and (15) yields
Vix i = aiÝ1 ? tiÞÝV3G/ß1 ? a1Ý1 ? t1Þ ? a2Ý1 ? t2ÞàÞ   #   
By virtue of Walras’ Law, these quantities and prices satisfy the budget constraint (6).
In the short-run, labour cannot change sectors, so
LiD ² Li, i = 1,2   #   
Equivalently, x i ² x i. This short run production possibility frontier is shown as the shaded area
in Figure 2. From (16) it defines, in the Ýt1, t2Þ space, the tax rate pairs for which the labour
constraints bind. Both constraints must be simultaneously satisfied, so the short run
‘tax-possibility’ set is as shown by the shaded area in Figure 1.
The reform equalises tax rates so (16) implies
Vix i = aiV3
Ý1 ? tÞ
t G, i = 1,2.   #   
A feasible choice of an equalised tax rate requires setting t = ts, say, with ts > tD. From (18) this
implies that x2 falls below its long run equilibrium value. Thus if full employment is possible at
all in any sector it would be in sector 1; a scenario which is consistent with the reduction in the
relative price of good 1. To this end the required tax rate ts has to meet the condition,
a1 V3V1
1 ? ts
ts G = x1   #   
where x1 is given by (9). This short term equilibrium is denoted by EST in Figures 1 and 2.
Welfare will have decreased vis à vis the initial situation ‘0’.
From (10) one can draw many lines above and parallel to the full employment constraint
through ELT in Figure 1; successively higher lines correspond to a larger fixed level of aggregate
unemployment. Therefore the specified short term policy is the “best” in the sense that amongst
all feasible equalised tax rates it is the one that minimises aggregate unemployment.
From (16):
L2D = V2x2 = a2Ý1 ? tsÞV3G/ts
and from (19)
ts/Ý1 ? tsÞ = a1V3G/L1
so:
L2D =
a2
a1 L1   #   
as there is full employment in sector one. Prior to the shock there is full employment of labour
(in both sectors) so (10) to (12) inclusive imply
L2 = 1 ? t21 ? t1
a2
a1 L1
= 1 ? t21 ? t1
L2D by (20).   #   
Hence, under the “best” policy, the short term rate of unemployment in sector 2 is:
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L2 ? L2D
L2
= t1 ? t21 ? t2
  #   
as in sector 2 employment is equal to labour demand.
The rate of unemployment is thus proportional to, and greater than, the difference in tax rates
which the transition reform is removing. We can also find, from (12) and (22), the minimum
economy-wide rate of unemployment:
L2 ? L2D
L = Ý1 ? aÞÝt1 ? t2Þ   #   
In centrally managed economies, the intersectoral differences in tax rates were extremely
large. A significant fraction of enterprises were heavily subsidized, while many of the remaining
enterprises were heavily taxed. The tax reforms of the early transition period tended to eliminate
enterprise subsidies and widen the tax base. The originally large difference t1 ? t2 was thus
reduced over a short period of time. The supply-side shocks which such tax changes brought
about might, in reality, have had the considerable contractionary effects which this model
implies.
These effects could well have been even greater than those given by formulas (22) and (23).
For tax equalization reforms were taking place under considerable uncertainty with respect to
outputs, but with a clear determination of the reformers to reduce or even remove budget deficits.
In such circumstances, the common tax rate t might have been set at a level higher than ts, and
public spending G at a level lower than that prevailing before transition. Our model implies that,
under such a fiscal policy, all sectoral outputs would initially be lower than before transition.
A rapid price liberalization and a large up-front devaluation of the domestic currency would
probably have compounded the effect of tax equalization on changes in relative prices.
Subsequent changes in the composition of demand, under the conditions of limited resource
mobility, could have therefore been sizeable enough to account for a large part of the
“transformational recession”.
Wage Flexibility and Employment
In an influential paper, Layard and Richter (1995) noted that in Russia real wages fell sharply
in response to initial falls of output, and argued that the observed low rate of unemployment can
be attributed to this exceptionally high wage flexibility. In our model wage flexibility can be
introduced by allowing the real wage rate in sector 2, one with unemployment post-transition, to
fall below the common rate which obtains before transition, and which continues in sector 1 after
transition.
To derive the implications for employment, we use equations (14) and (15), in which wages
are now sector-specific. We retain the full employment condition for sector 1. Simple algebra
gives the employment level in sector 2.
L2 ¯ V2x2 = 1 ? aa
w1
w2
?
L1   #   
Since, by (21), L# 1/L# 2 = a1?a
1?t1
1?t2
and by (12) L# 2/L = Ý1 ? aÞÝ1 ? t2Þ, the unemployment rates
are now as follows: in sector 2,
u2 ¯ L
# 2 ? L2
L# 2
= 1 ? w1w2
1 ? t1
1 ? t2
  #   
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and economy-wide,
u ¯ L
# 2 ? L2
L =
L# 2 ? L2
L# 2
L# 2
L = Ý1 ? aÞÝ1 ? t2Þu2   #   
Thus, unemployment would be lower if a gap opens up between sectoral wages. If the gap is
sufficiently large, there would be no unemployment (and no recession) whatsoever. The reason
is that a removal of subsidy is then (partially) compensated for by a reduction of the wage rate, so
that the relative price of the no longer subsidised product increases less.
However, as the intitial sectoral composition of the economy is distorted and suboptimal, this
sub-optimiality would be preserved through the substitution of a tax distortion by a wage
distortion. Moreover, this wage distortion cannot be sustained in the long term. Thus, when a
limited mobility constraint is binding, the transformational recession inflicts a welfare cost in the
short-run, but this temporary cost can be viewed as an investment needed to obtain a permanent
improvement.
Extensions
The analysis in section 4 above assumes that the utility function for households is of the
Cobb-Douglas type, i.e. that the substitution elasticity between the two private goods is unitary.
Clearly, any impact of changes in relative prices would be lower (higher) than the one derived in
that section if the magnitude of that elasticity were lower (higher). In the extreme case of these
goods being perfect complements (zero substitution elasticity), the quantities demanded are
independent of prices, and therefore, any price shocks would have no effect at all on sectoral
outputs and employments. In the other extreme case, in which the goods are perfect substitutes,
tax equalization would lead to the total collapse of one of the sectors, that producing the good
which is relatively more expensive after the transition. In a real economy with many private
goods, we would therefore expect greater output contraction to take place in industries where the
increase in unit costs is relatively greater, and producing goods which are easier to substitute.
The empirical evidence is consistent with that conclusion (Czyzewski et.al. 1995, Zukowski
1998).
This analysis can be extended to recognize also capital as an input, investment as a type of
demand and profits as a form of income. In an earlier paper we discussed the potential impact of
an external price shock in a two-sector model with capital accumulation (Gomulka and Lane,
1997). The presence of capital, investment and profits complicates the analysis, but its
conclusions are similar to those obtained in this paper. The main substantive gain of such an
extension is that it allows one to highlight the path-dependence of any post-transition
adjustments in response to the initial recession. This path-dependence is particularly important
when the intersectoral mobility of capital is restricted and the labour-capital substitution
elasticity is small. In such circumstances, since initial recession typically reduces capital
accumulation, the task of restoring full-employment equilibrium is a more prolonged affair.
Another extension of the analysis is from 2 private goods to n goods (plus the n + 1 public
good). The goods can be ranked by the tax rate, so that t1 > t2 > ... > tn before transition.
Following the tax equalization reform, assuming the Cobb-Douglas utility function, the labour
constraint would be, at best, binding only in sector 1. The importance of this extension lies in
pointing out that, under limited mobility, the state of unemployment would prevail in (almost)
the entire economy.
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Concluding Remarks
The usual textbook assumption of unrestricted resource mobility between production lines
within enterprises and between enterprises, is realistic under normal circumstances of gradual
changes in the product composition of total demand. However, most post-communist transitions
took place in conditions of total (institutional, political, economic) crisis, which forced rapid and
large changes in this product composition. Similarly, large changes took place during transition
from war-time to peace-time just after WWII in the USA, Japan and Germany. As many labour
and capital inputs are product-specific, the economy tends to respond to such rapid changes in
demand with considerable inertia with respect to the allocation of resources. We suggest that
inevitably large changes on the demand side and this inertia in the rate of adjustment on the
supply side has been the main cause of the large falls in outputs observed during the early phase
of transition.
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